Spheres of Influence - The Alleged Jordanian Coup reveals US Middle Eastern anxieties over Trade War with China
Vague allegations of a coup conspiracy in Jordan have rang louder-than-expected alarms across political actors in the region. Why?
Vague allegations of a coup conspiracy in Jordan have rang louder-than-expected alarms among political actors in the region. How do the domestic politics of the Middle Eastern Kingdom reflect American geopolitical anxieties over China’s Belt and Road initiative?
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On 3 April 2021, Jordanian authorities announced the high profile arrests of Bassem Awadallah, former Chief of the Royal Court, and Sharif Hassan Bin Zaid, a low profile member of the royal family, along with 16 to 19 unnamed individuals for their involvement in a plot vaguely described as “targeting the country's security”. Later, those unnamed individuals were revealed to be mainly the aides and security of Prince Hamzah, the half-brother of King Abdullah II.
Soon after, unconfirmed rumors began stirring over social media that the former crown prince himself had been placed under house arrest. Prince Hamzah bin Hussein is a popular figure amongst Jordanians, known for his efforts to remain close to the ground of domestic politics, particularly among tribal and East Bank Jordanians who serve as the military and political backbone of the country.
The following day on 4 April 2021, the BBC released two videos passed to them by Hamzah’s lawyer, one in Arabic and one in English, where the Prince confirmed his house arrest, rocking the otherwise traditionally calm Middle Eastern kingdom. He began the video stating that he was visited by Major General Yousef Huneiti, the Chief of General Staff of the Jordanian Armed Forces, who informed him that he “was not allowed to go out [of his home], to communicate with people [online] or to meet with them” for allegations of taking part in meetings in which the king had been criticized and threatened Jordan’s "security and stability". He went on to say "I am not the person responsible for the breakdown in governance, the corruption and for the incompetence that has been prevalent in our governing structure for the last 15 to 20 years... I'm not part of any conspiracy or nefarious organization or foreign-backed group, as is always the claim here for anyone who speaks out… and I am not responsible for the lack of faith people have in their institutions… It has reached a point where no-one is able to speak or express opinion on anything without being... threatened."
Following the release of Hamzah’s video, Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi during a press conference confirmed Hamzah’s arrest. He added that intelligence services had been investigating the former crown prince for some time and accused him of conspiring with “foreign entities” to organize a coup attempt against the King.
Events have cooled over following a tense but positive meeting between King Abdullah II and Prince Hamzah where the latter signed a letter affirming his loyalty to the Monarch. A Palace statement was released on behalf of the Prince bearing his signature, which stated “The interest of the nation comes above all else and we all should stand behind His Majesty in his efforts to protect Jordan and its interests… in light of the developments of the past two days I put myself in the hands of the king, following the steps of my forefathers”. While an eerie silence of peace rings now, many suspect that this isn’t the end of this episode, with Prince Hamzah understood to have agreed to remain under house arrest despite his public statements broadcasted by the BBC.
Who Was Arrested?
Bassem Awadallah and Sharif Hassan bin Zaid are Jordanian political figures both known to have extensive business and political ties in Saudi Arabia. Awadallah is a controversial figure amongst Jordanians, commonly associated with corruption during his many different tenures serving in the Jordanian government, including as director of the Office of King Abdullah II and chief of the Royal Hashemite Court of Jordan. The Middle East Eye reports that Awadallah is “known for maintaining a network of prominent business connections [in the region], including through his presence on the board of directors of Al Baraka Banking Group in Bahrain” and his “extensive partnerships with Saudi businessmen in the Arab National Bank (ANB)”.
In addition to his business ties, Awadallah has been serving as a consultant to Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in the last few years. Interestingly, the Washington Post reported that a delegation sent by the Saudi foreign minister refused to leave Jordan without taking Awadallah back to Riyadh with them. Saudi officials have rejected this.
Much less is known about the aloof Sharif Hassan. He was allegedly a former special envoy to Saudi Arabia on behalf of the Jordanian government. Jordanian news website al-Ghawas reported that bin Zaid "lives and owns investments in Saudi Arabia".
In addition to these political and economic ties, Awadallah and Sharif Hassan’s dual nationalities, holding both Jordanian and Saudi citizenships, were seen as potential links to foreign involvements in the alleged coup plot.
Was there a Coup Plot?
With Jordan’s press and social media ban on discussing the topic of Prince Hamzah, there has been little information on the nature of the alleged coup plot and the identities of the “foreign entities” involved. Despite Awadallah and Sharif Hassan’s provocative positioning alongside a perceived potential challenger to the throne, it is highly unlikely that a coup attempt was in the works.
While Prince Hamzah certainly has “for some time been singing from his own songsheet… closer to the opposition than the official line” as Oraib Al-Rantawi, an analyst with the Al-Quds Centre for Policy Studies, describes, it is also “impossible to prepare a coup d'etat without the support of the main army units and the security and intelligence services… all [of which] are behind the king”. Al-Rantawi also adds that none of those arrested “have the profile or the capacity to lead a coup”.
It would remain a mystery if Prince Hamzah had truly been liaising with foreign political forces in the Gulf through Awadallah and Sharif Hassan as is being speculated, only known to a few select intelligence agencies across the globe. The probable scenario is that Prince Hamzah’s contrarian political activism and populist posturing had grown larger as a perceived threat at a time of heightened political tension against the government, exacerbated by the Covid-19 pandemic. The arrests may have likely been security and intelligence forces working to pre-emptively snuff out a potential counter-political development, rather than the timely interception of an organized plot as it is being framed by the Foreign Minister.
Global Implications
This relatively quiet incident, while seemingly small in the grand scheme of international relations, reveals how US hegemony in the region lies on top of a fragile house of cards that could collapse by small disturbances such as the (developing) Prince Hamzah incident. Despite the public virtually knowing nothing and the capital of Amman remaining relatively still following the protests of March, many of Jordan’s global and regional allies were unusually quick to pledge support to King Abdullah II when the arrests were announced, just prior to the BBC’s release of Hamzah’s videos while Jordanians were still in the dark, anxiously speculating on social media about events behind the scenes. On April 7th, Joe Biden called King Abdullah II to reassure the US’s support. It appears that threats to the small resource-poor nation seems to stir swift response from the US and its allies in the region.
In the Middle East, US foreign policy in the last few years has taken a more emboldened approach in pushing for diplomatic normalization with Israel amongst its Arab allies compared to decades prior, with the ‘Deal of the Century’, the US-Israeli blueprint for establishing a two-state solution with little Palestinian consultation, and the Abraham Accords, the UAE-Israel peace agreement, seen as the defining frameworks for this imposed new future in the region.
As some analysts and commentators have noted, this foreign policy approach to ameliorate the decades-long animosity toward Israel in the region puts economics first, and politics second. The US is banking on market interests in trade and commerce to act as the diplomatic glue to bring these nations together in an economic bloc under US patronage, with little to no concessions made by Israel on the illegal occupation of the Palestinian territories which first birthed these animosities in the 20th century. Indeed, following the UAE’s controversial breaking of the mold in formally establishing diplomatic relations with Israel, the US has pressured other nations in the region to follow suit, including Morocco, Oman and most successfully Sudan, whose categorization as a world state sponsor of terrorism by the US was swiftly removed following their agreement with Israel.
One can speculate that the US’s recent bid to hastily quash the regions’ decades long animosity toward Israel and form a diplomatically unified economic bloc comes in response to China’s swift unrolling of their Belt and Road Initiative over the last decade, a global infrastructure project to establish rails, roads and other transport to facilitate trade from China through Southeast Asia to South Asia, to the Middle East and eventually Africa. The consolidation of a unified pro-US economic bloc in the Middle East would geographically intercept those plans, strategically cutting access to Africa and monopolizing Middle Eastern markets. In a similar vein to the infrastructure focused approach of China to facilitate burgeoning trade relations, transnational infrastructure projects in the region have begun to be mapped out, including a potential “peace railway” crossing through Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and other Gulf states.
In a manner similar to Cold War era international relations, the US’ stakes in the Middle East appear to be higher than ever due to this ever escalating trade war. In addition to physically cutting through China’s Belt and Road Initiative, unifying the Middle East diplomatically also entails securing the flow of global supply chains and commerce to continue to go uninterrupted, and with it the “war” effort against China. The US needs regional security interests to be aligned to guarantee continued smooth commerce. With the recent obstruction of the Suez Canal by a stuck container ship reminding the world of the global geopolitical significance of the Middle East beyond just its resources, US economic interests would be critically hampered should a regional war lead to another Suez Canal Crisis or Arab Oil Embargo, bringing world trade to a screeching halt and giving China the unforeseen advantage in the trade war. It is here where unsuspecting political actors like Prince Hamzah threaten to tip the balance.
Returning to Jordan; despite being a small resource poor country, the Kingdom plays a critical role in upholding the tapestry of US foreign policy in the region. Since 1952, the United States has provided Jordan with economic assistance totaling more than $14 billion, telling of the geopolitical investment the US has placed on the Hashemite government. The Kingdom has long been credited with playing a strategic role in maintaining US foreign interests, historically functioning as a friendly bulwark for Israel against Syria, Iraq and other Arab Nations, while providing support toward US military efforts in Syria. For Jordan to be seized by a government unfriendly toward Israel or the US would likely cause a domino effect across the region threatening the continued stability of US interests in the face of China’s expanding economic reach.
While the Kingdom had already established diplomatic relations with Israel in 1994, with the majority of Jordan’s population being Palestinian and the Hashemite Monarch claim to Jerusalem in their religious-political role as the Custodian of the Two Mosques, there remains a degree of hostility toward Israel within domestic Jordanian political discourse despite diplomatic formalities. To fully embrace diplomatic relations in the manner in which the UAE has would be seen as crossing a redline domestically, but a redline Jordan has long beeneggedon to cross by developing political economic forces in the region now in full throttle with the Deal of the Century and the Abraham Accords.
While Hamzah has not commented on recent regional normalization efforts with Israel nor lamented Jordan’s co-operation with the US, he explicitly stated in the video sent to the BBC that he disapproves of the “incompetence that has been prevalent in governing structure[s] for the last 15 to 20 years”, a timeframe which coincides with King Abdullah’s neoliberal economic reforms in the early 2000s which saw increased privatization of the economy and the cutting of already weak social safety nets. Should Hamzah had seized power as is being alleged, with his disapproval of Jordan’s global free market oriented economic policy and tribal populist sympathies, the Prince may have curtailed these US hegemonic efforts at establishing region wide diplomatic and, more crucially, trade relations to counter the Belt and Road initiative.
If the internal affairs of the royal house of a small kingdom could potentially threaten to accelerate the geopolitical consequences of a trade war, then there must be a sober reflection on the sustainability of the current global free market given its apparent effect on politics both foreign and domestic worldwide. Smaller nations like Jordan, many of whom are former colonies, have long had their political sovereignty be subject to the whims of the world’s economic superpowers who effectively dictate the flows of capital. For the globalized political economy developed over the last 30 years to start moving in an equitable and less violent direction, the domestic turmoil and foreign policy obligations it structurally imposes on smaller nations must eventually be addressed; lest they fester and burst in potentially violent episodes such as a coup, or worse.